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Abstract
Background. One of the constraints in the utilisation of mater-
nal healthcare in India is the out-of-pocket expenditure. To
improve the utilisation and to reduce the out-of-pocket expendi-
ture, India launched a cash incentive scheme, Janani Suraksha
Yojana (JSY), which provides monetary incentive to the mothers
delivering in public facility. However, no study has yet examined
the extent to which the JSY payments reduce the maternal health-
care induced catastrophic out-of-pocket expenditure burden of the
households. This paper therefore attempts to examine the extent to
which the JSY reduces the catastrophic expenditure estimate
household expenditure on maternity, i.e., all direct and indirect
expenditure.  
Materials and methods. The study used data on 396 mothers
collected through a primary survey conducted in the rural areas of
the Varanasi district of Uttar Pradesh state in 2013-2014. The degree
and variation in the catastrophic impact of households’ maternity
spending was computed as share of out-of-pocket payment in total
household income in relation to specific thresholds, across socio-
economic categories. Logistic regression was used to understand the
determinants of catastrophic expenditure and whether the JSY has
any role in influencing the expenditure pattern.   
Results. Results revealed that the JSY beneficiaries on an aver-
age spent about 8.3% of their Annual Household Consumption
Expenditure on maternity care. The JSY reimbursement could
reduce this share only by 2.1%. The study found that the expendi-
ture on antenatal and postnatal care made up a significant part of
the direct medical expenditure on maternity among the JSY bene-
ficiaries. The indirect or non-medical expenditure was about four
times higher than the direct expenditure on maternity services.
The out-of-pocket expenditure across income quintiles was found
to be regressive i.e. the poor paid a greater proportion of their
income towards maternity care than the rich. Results also showed
that the JSY reimbursement helped only about 8% households to
escape from suffering catastrophic burden due to maternity pay-
ments. 
Conclusions. It can be concluded that the JSY appeared to
have achieved only a limited success in reducing the economic
burden due to maternity. To reduce the catastrophic burden, policy
makers should consider increasing the JSY reimbursement to
cover not only antenatal and postnatal services but also non-med-
ical expenditure due to maternity. The government should also
take appropriate measures to curb non-medical or indirect expen-
diture in public health facilities. 
Introduction
Maternal mortality is the main contributor to female mortality
during the reproductive span. India, the largest democracy in the
world, bears the brunt of the highest number (56,000 in 2010) of
maternal deaths in the world.1 It is an established fact that ensur-
ing facility-based skilled professional care for every mother could
bring down maternal mortality significantly.2,3 However, the level
of maternal healthcare utilisation in the country is still low. One
reason behind such a low usage of these services is that a consid-
erable number of households have very low or no capacity to pay
for such services.4-6 For such households, the out-of-pocket
expenditure on maternity care at times become catastrophic due to
the lack of insurance or other risk pooling mechanisms.7-13
To increase the utilisation of maternal health care and to
reduce the out-of-pocket expenditure of maternity care, India in
the year 2005 launched the Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY), a safe
motherhood scheme, in 18 low performing states (in terms of
socio-economic and demographic indicators) under the umbrella
of the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM).14 This scheme
provides a cash incentive of Rs.1400 ($22) to the mothers who
give birth in a public health facility, and Rs.500 ($8) to the women
below poverty line who deliver at home assisted by trained profes-
sionals. The first Annual Health Survey (2010-11) revealed that
this has led to an increase in the institutional delivery in some
states, which had recorded low institutional delivery prior to the
NRHM. For instance, the percentage of institutional delivery in
Uttar Pradesh (demographically the largest state of India)
increased from 22 percent in 2005-06 to 45.6 percent in 2010-
11).15,16 
A review of previous literature reveals that there exist several
studies on the coverage of maternal care services and the differen-
tials in the out-of-pocket expenditure on maternity care in India.
Significance for public health
Improving the well-being of mothers is an important public health goal for
India. For improving maternal health, it is necessary that mothers utilize
maternity services. However, maternity often becomes an economic burden,
especially for disadvantaged and poorer groups of the society. To encourage
mothers to utilize services, India launched a conditional maternity benefit
transfer scheme back in 2005. This study explored whether the scheme has
been able to help alleviate the burden of maternity expenditure or not. The
study finds that the scheme has been successful only partially to reduce out-
of-pocket expenditure suggesting that maternity is a costly affair in rural
India. Since the scheme is unable to save mothers from catastrophic expen-
ditures, it is also unable to save mothers from a wide ranges of health ill-
effects caused by catastrophic expenditure.  
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However, most of them do not focus on the JSY. For instance, Goli
et al. (2016) measured the out-of-pocket expenditure on maternity
care, they, however, did not mention any role of JSY in reducing
the same.17 Even a number of state specific studies that examined
the impact of the JSY did not measure the out-of-pocket expendi-
ture borne by the JSY beneficiaries.18,19 Studies that do measure
the impact of the JSY on reducing the out-of-pocket expenditure
on maternity care have restricted themselves to analysing only
delivery care expenditure, possibly because of data constraints.20-
22 Thus, there are barely any studies available on the post-JSY sce-
nario of antenatal and postnatal care related costs. 
The JSY was launched to encourage mothers to use free ser-
vices at the point of delivery in addition a cash incentive of $22.
Although maternal healthcare services in all public health facilities
are supposed to be free, childbirth in these facilities often incurs a
variety of medical (direct) and non-medical (indirect) out-of-pock-
et expenditures. Previous studies have considered only medical or
direct expenditure while calculating the out-of-pocket expenditure
on maternity care even though the indirect or non-medical costs
such as loss of wages of women during maternity, loss of wage of
husbands for accompanying, transportation and special food costs
for the woman may impact households’ financial situation nega-
tively. To the best of our knowledge, no study has measured the
role of indirect or non-medical expenditure yet.  
This paper therefore attempts to estimate maternity expendi-
ture, i.e., all direct (formal and informal medical expenditure) and
indirect expenditure incurred by households, due to maternity and
examine the extent to which the JSY incentives covered the burden
of costs incurred. The background factors influencing the materni-
ty expenditure have also been assessed. These objectives are
addressed in the context of Varanasi district of the Uttar Pradesh
state – a largely rural state that is home to about over 200 million
people and has the highest maternal and child mortality among
Indian states. 
Materials and Methods
Area of the study
The study area, Varanasi district, is in Uttar Pradesh, the most
populous state in India, with over 200 million people living over
an area of 93,000 square miles. Due to high levels of pre-NRHM
maternal and infant mortality,16,23 the state was identified as one of
the high focus states where the JSY was to be implemented. It is
noteworthy that Post-NRHM, maternal and infant mortality has
reduced considerably and the coverage of institutional delivery has
risen to about 46% by 2010-11.15
Sampling and data collection 
To obtain a comparison of maternal health care expenditure
incurred by JSY and non-JSY beneficiary, it was necessary to
select a district with a fair share of both type of institutional deliv-
eries – deliveries conducted in public and deliveries conducted in
private facilities. Therefore, all 70 districts of the state were ranked
by their coverage of institutional delivery as reported in the Annual
Health Survey (AHS), 2010-11. The district of Varanasi was select-
ed as it satisfied both criteria - the percentage of institutional deliv-
ery in the district was relatively high, and it also had a fair share of
both kind of deliveries - about 25% conducted in public health
facilities and about 40% in private health facilities.15
A field survey was conducted during October 2013 to April
2014 in rural areas of the Varanasi district. Only those households
that had at least one woman with a history of child birth during the
period of 12 months preceding the survey, were considered for
inclusion in the study. To select the households, the survey used
two-stage sampling - villages in the first stage and from these vil-
lages, women with a birth during the reference period in the second
stage. The villages were selected with probability proportional to
size after stratification by village population size and the number
of women to be selected from each village was specified so that the
sample becomes self-weighting. 
From each village, a list of women who delivered in the spec-
ified reference period was prepared with the help of community
health workers and the stipulated number selected at random. A
sample size of 400 was proposed taking into account sampling
error and in order to accommodate non-response the sample size
was raised by 10% to 440 so that about 400 women would be suc-
cessfully interviewed. However, a total of 396 women could be
contacted and were interviewed; of whom, 223 women had
received JSY benefits as they delivered in public healthcare facili-
ties and 173 women had not received any JSY benefits since they
either delivered at home (n=31) assisted by unskilled birth atten-
dant or at a private health facility (n=142). In this paper, the terms
JSY beneficiary and non JSY have been used for these two groups
respectively. No woman in this study was found to have delivered
at an accredited private hospital hence not eligible to receive any
JSY benefits. 
Informed consent
A permission to carry out the study in villages was sought from
the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) of Varanasi district. The village
head (Gram Pradhan) of each selected village was briefed about
the study and a permission was sought to contact the eligible
women for the study. Finally, informed consent was sought from
all the participants involved in the survey. They were assured that
the information provided by the participants would be used for
research purpose only and their identity would not be revealed to
anyone. They were also informed that they had the right to termi-
nate the interview if they felt uncomfortable to answer any ques-
tion during interview. The respondents were very helpful and
cooperative and no respondent left the interview without complet-
ing the schedule.
Measurement of maternity expenditure and monthly
per capita consumption expenditure
To estimate maternity expenditure, i.e., all direct (formal and
informal medical expenditure) and indirect expenditure incurred
due to maternity by households, a list of possible items of expen-
diture was prepared and used to obtain accurate and complete
information on all expenditures on maternity for all the eligible
women. A detailed information was collected with some close-
ended questions on the direct and indirect expenditure incurred by
the household due to maternity. 
Direct expenditure is defined as all formal and informal
expenses on maternal health care. Formal expenditure includes all
costs of drugs and medicine, cost incurred in laboratory tests, pro-
fessional’s fees, bed charges and costs incurred to treat complica-
tions during antenatal, natal, and postnatal period. The informal
fees comprise kickbacks, bribes or gratitude amount paid by the
member of the household to avail facility-based care.  
Indirect expenditure covers productivity losses and opportuni-
ty cost of care seeking that included wage loss of woman due to
maternity, wage loss of husband for accompanying woman to the
health centre for prenatal, delivery or post-natal care, costs of buy-
ing special food for woman and travel cost to visit the health facil-
ity, travel and food costs of accompanying person to the health
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facility. Reporting of expenditure on maternity and households by
the respondents was further cross checked by the reporting of elder
member (s) of the households. This was the method also applied by
the National Sample Survey Organization (2006) in India.24
Wage loss for the mother was calculated based on the number
of days lost during pregnancy, childbirth, and post-delivery period.
If the woman was being paid wages, then the amount of wage loss
was calculated according to the number of days of wage loss she
reported. If a woman was absent from unpaid family work she was
asked about who took the charge of her activities during her nonat-
tendance, and if the persons who took the responsibility of the day-
to-day activities were paid, then the amount was asked. At last, the
wage rate of the employed person was multiplied by the number of
days that he/she worked for while the woman was absent.
Husband’s loss of wages due to accompanying wife during
ANC, delivery or PNC was calculated by asking the women. In
case, the husband worked in a regular job and was granted leave
without losing the wage/salary, no loss of wages was presumed.
However, for the daily labourer, the loss of wage was calculated by
multiplying the number of days lost to the wage rate.
Monthly Per capita Consumption Expenditure (MPCE) has
been used as a proxy variable for the income of households. The
calculation of MPCE for this study is in line with India’s National
Sample Survey (NSSO) method using Mixed Reference Period
(MRP).24 Following this approach, household consumption expen-
diture on items of clothing, footwear, education and durable goods,
house maintenance, and other non- food items (conveyance,
amusement, sundry articles etc.) is recorded for a reference period
of last 365 days, and expenditure on all other food items is docu-
mented with a reference period of last 30 days. To obtain the
monthly expenditure, the expenditure on non-food items (which
were collected with a reference period of 12 months) was divided
by 12. The consumption expenditure on food and non-food items
was then added to get the total consumption expenditure of the
household. Finally, adjustments were done according to the house-
hold size to get the MPCE.  
Measurement of catastrophic expenditure and cata-
strophic overshoot
The calculation of catastrophic expenditure on maternity care
requires data on the total out-of-pocket maternity expenditure and
the total household consumption expenditure/income.20 As men-
tioned earlier, the household consumption expenditure has been
used as the proxy income variable in the study.25 The MPCE is
multiplied by twelve to obtain the annual consumption expendi-
ture. This study considers 10% of the total annual consumption
expenditure and 40% of the capacity-to-pay or the total non-food
expenditure as threshold limits. The expenditure is called catas-
trophic if the total expenditure on maternity care is more than 10%
of the total annual consumption expenditure or alternatively, if it
exceeds 40% of the capacity-to-pay.9,26,27 Another measure, the
mean catastrophic payment overshoot, or the intensity of catas-
trophic payment, captures the average degree by which the pay-
ments (as a proportion of total expenditure) exceed the threshold.
Examining predictors of catastrophic maternal health
care expenditure
A binary logistic regression was carried out to examine how
catastrophic maternity expenditure is associated with socio-eco-
nomic characteristics. The dependent variable i.e., whether the
expenditure was catastrophic (0=non-catastrophic; 1=catastroph-
ic) was a dichotomous variable. The logit of the probability of
occurrence, p, is expressed as a function of a set of explanatory
variables {Xi} as: logit(p) = log (p/(1-p)) = β0 + Σβi Xi where {βi}
are the regression coefficients to be estimated. For a more mean-
ingful interpretation of results, predicted probabilities (of the
expenditure being catastrophic) have been computed for each cat-
egory holding the other variables constant at the mean values.28
From the estimated coefficients, the predicted odds for a given set
of values of {Xi} can be computed as exp (β0 + ΣβiXi) and the pre-
dicted probability of occurrence as exp (β0 + Σβi Xi)/ [1+ exp (β0
+ Σβi Xi)].  In the present analysis, such predicted probabilities
have been computed and expressed in percentage terms as adjusted
percentages.
This regression analysis included several key socio-economic
and demographic variables as predictors of catastrophic expendi-
ture. The choice of the variables to be included was guided by the
existing literature in the Indian context.9,27,29 Household income,
religion, caste, and education are some important socio-economic
variables that previous studies have found to have considerable
influence the health seeking behaviour of women in India.9,12,26,30
Among demographic variables, the age of woman is considered an
important predictor variable of the utilization of maternity care ser-
vices. The parity of woman and the sex of the child have been
found to determine the decision to go for an institutional delivery;
women with higher age and higher birth order are less likely to use
maternity services.3 All independent variables were categorical. 
Results
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the study popula-
tion. It reveals that a great majority of the sampled JSY beneficia-
ries were Hindu and belonged to OBC category. About 65% of the
JSY beneficiaries had two to three children whereas the proportion
of such women among non-JSY women was about 57%. About
half of the women included in the study were illiterate and over
65% women who received JSY did not work outside other than
their household chores. About 36% JSY beneficiaries reported that
their husbands worked as casual labourer; the corresponding figure
for the non-JSY women was about 30%. The distribution across
consumption quintiles did not reveal any significant difference
between JSY beneficiaries and non-JSY women. For most vari-
ables, the two groups were within a close range. 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of direct and indirect
expenditure incurred due to maternity segregated by JSY benefi-
ciaries and non-JSY. It reveals that the mean total expenditure for
JSY beneficiaries and non-JSY women was Rs.5975 and
Rs.23632, respectively. In other words, the mean total maternity
expenditure incurred by JSY beneficiaries was about one fourth of
the amount incurred by non-JSY women. The total direct expendi-
ture among the non-JSY women was about 16 times higher than
JSY beneficiaries while the indirect expenditures for both groups
were similar. A major part of the total expenditure came from the
indirect expenditure indicating that maternity not just incurs med-
ical (direct) costs but also brings about other financial burden. The
median expenditure on ANC and PNC for the JSY beneficiaries
and on PNC for non-JSY women indicated that about half of the
women either did not utilize the service or did not spend anything
on the same. 
Table 3 presents the expenditure on maternity care as the share
of annual consumption expenditure of the household by expendi-
ture quintiles. It also provides information about the reduction in
out-of-pocket expenditure after JSY beneficiaries got reimbursed.
The results show that on an average total maternal expenditure
among JSY beneficiaries worked out at about 8% of their annual
household consumption expenditure, whereas among non-JSY
women, it turned out to be much higher – about 28% of their annu-
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al household consumption expenditure. The reimbursement of the
JSY money reduced the share of maternity expenditure only by
2.1% of annual household consumption expenditure. It is evident
from the results that the expenditure burden declines progressively
as one moves from a lower to a higher expenditure quintile. A
sharp rich-poor gap in the share of expenditure indicated that
health care expenditure was highly regressive, i.e., the poor spent
a relatively higher proportion of their disposable income (12.9%)
than the rich. (5.3%). In order to determine whether poor house-
holds incurred more maternity payment than rich households, the
concentration index (CI) was calculated. Negative index (-0.185)
for both JSY beneficiary and (-0.187) non-JSY means that poorer
economic groups were more likely to bear the burden of catas-
trophic maternal health care expenditures than their counterparts in
richer economic groups. To investigate how far the JSY reduced
the economic burden, we presented an analysis (JSY without reim-
bursement) before deducting the JSY incentive from the total
maternity expenditure, this generated a hypothetical situation of
what proportion of household would have incurred catastrophic
expenditure, had JSY not been introduced (Table 4). It was
observed that the catastrophic headcount was much higher for the
non-JSY women (78.6%) than that of the JSY beneficiaries
(33.7%). Even after taking the JSY incentive into consideration,
the catastrophic headcount for the JSY beneficiaries remained a lit-
tle over 25%. The overshoot (after incentive was considered) still
turned out to be about 3.5% of the total income which means that
about 25.6% JSY beneficiary households, who spent more than
one-tenth of their income on maternity care, exceeded the catas-
trophic threshold on an average by about 3.5%. The mean catas-
trophic payment overshoot as assessed by the capacity to pay or
non-food expenditure threshold was much higher than the one
assessed by the percent of income threshold both for JSY benefi-
ciaries and non-JSY women.
Table 5 presents differentials in the mean out-of-pocket expen-
ditures on maternity by selected background characteristics. The
average out-of-pocket expenditure was lower among Muslim
women compared to Hindu women. The total expenditure incurred
by ‘working’ women was found to be high as the loss of wage due
to maternity substantially raised the burden of OOP expenditure on
maternity. The JSY beneficiaries whose husbands were engaged in
agricultural activities incurred the highest OOP expenditure on
maternity followed by those women whose husbands worked as
casual labour. Poorer JSY beneficiaries spent belonging to two bot-
tom (poorest and poor) quintiles more money on maternity than the
ones beloning to the two top (rich and richer) quintiles.    
The gross (unadjusted) and net (adjusted based on logistic
regression coefficients) percentages of catastrophic head counts
for both, the 10% of total annual consumption expenditure thresh-
old and the 40% of non-food expenditure threshold, are also pre-
sented in Table 5. Results of logistic regressions showed the deter-
minants of catastrophic maternity expenditure. Adjusted percent-
ages are the predicted probabilities (expressed as percentages) of
the dependent variable computed for each category from the logit
regression coefficients, holding the other variables at average level
or distribution. The results show that more Hindu households both
at 10% of total income threshold and at 40% of non-food expendi-
ture threshold incurred catastrophic maternity expenditure (as
shown in the unadjusted percentages) compared to Muslim house-
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for all components of maternal health care expenditure, field survey, rural Varanasi, 2013-14.
Composition of expenditure                     JSY beneficiary (in INR)                                                Non JSY (in INR)
                                                                  Mean          Median           Max            SD                            Mean        Median         Max           SD
Direct expenditure on ANC                                      358                       0                      7000                 887                                      2627                 400                40,950             5577
Direct expenditure on delivery                                659                     320                  17,800              1888                                    12,891              8000               75,000            13109
Direct expenditure on PNC                                      152                       0                    10,000              1007                                     1936                   0                    5034             40,000
Total direct expenditure                                           1169                    540                  19,600              2614                                    17,455             11,450             103,950          17,456
Total indirect expenditure                                       4806                   3530                 21,670              3677                                     6177                4650                23110             4545
Total expenditure                                                       5975                   4400                 28,250              4611                                    23,632             17,000             110,030          18,354
ANC: Antenatal care; PNC: Postnatal care; INR: Indian National Rupee. One US$ was approximately equal to Rs.60 in 2014; SD: Standard Deviation. Here the total expenditure is the amount before JSY reimbursement.
After JSY reimbursement the amount is Rs.4575 (Mean) and Rs.3000 (Median). JSY beneficiary (n=223), non JSY (n=173). 
Table 1. Background characteristics of surveyed women, field sur-
vey, Rural Varanasi, 2013-14.
Background characteristics JSY beneficiary         Non-JSY
                                                         %              n            %           n
Religion                                                                                                                        
       Hindu                                                       80.3               179            86.1           149
       Muslim                                                    19.7                44             13.9            24
Caste                                                                                                                             
       Scheduled castes                                 16.6                37             19.7            34
       Other backward classes                      70.9               158            71.1           123
       Others                                                     12.6                28              9.2             16
Age of mother (in years)                                                                                         
       15-24                                                         54.3               121            57.8           100
       25 and above                                          45.7               102            42.2            73
Parity                                                                                                                             
       1                                                                26.5                59             30.1            52
       2 to 3                                                        64.6               144            57.2            99
       4 to 7                                                         9.0                 20             12.7            22
Education of woman                                                                                                  
       Illiterate or below primary school    55.6               124            40.5            70
       High school                                            16.1                36             27.7            48
       Above high school                                 28.3                63             31.8            55
Work status of woman                                                                                              
       Working                                                    35                  78             34.7            60
       Non-working                                            65                 145            65.3           113
Occupation of husband                                                                                            
       Casual labour                                         39.5                88             30.1            52
       Agriculture                                              8.5                 19             10.4            18
       Business                                                 26.9                60             24.9            43
       Regular salary                                        25.1                56             27.2            47
Expenditure quintiles                                                                                               
       Poorest                                                    18.4                41             19.7            34
       Poor                                                         18.4                41             20.2            35
       Middle                                                     22.9                51             20.2            35
       Rich                                                          21.1                47             20.2            35
       Richest                                                    19.3                43             19.7            34
       All                                                              100                223             100            173
Note: n=number of women.
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Table 3. Expenditure on maternity as share of annual household consumption expenditure, field survey, Rural Varanasi, 2013-14. 
Expenditure quintiles                                        Expenditure as percentage of AHCE   
                                                               JSY beneficiary                                                                              Non JSY              
                                              TDE        TIDE      TMHCE               After JSY            JSY reduces
                                                                                                  reimbursement      OOP share by                     TDE           TIDE          TMHCE
Poorest                                                2.2              10.7               12.9                               10.2                                  2.7                                         27.1                 16.8                   43.9
Poor                                                      2.9               8.1                 11                                  8.5                                   2.5                                         26.6                  10                     36.6
Middle                                                 1.4               7.6                  9                                   6.8                                   2.2                                         25.4                  7.7                    33.2
Rich                                                      1.7                 5                  6.7                                 4.9                                   1.8                                         22.2                  5.6                    27.8
Richest                                                0.6               4.8                 5.3                                   4                                    1.3                                          13                   4.6                    17.6
All                                                          1.6               6.7                 8.3                                 6.2                                   2.1                                         20.5                  7.3                    27.8
TDE: Total direct expenditure, TIDE: Total indirect expenditure, TMHCE: Total maternal health care expenditure, AHCE: Annual household consumption expenditure.
Table 4. Catastrophic headcounts and overshoots at different thresholds, field survey, Rural Varanasi, 2013-14.
                                                        Catastrophic headcount and overshoot                                             Catastrophic headcount and 
                                                        at 10% consumption expenditure                                                 overshoot at 40% of capacity to pay
                                                                            threshold
                                                      HC                                                  Overshoot                              HC                                                Overshoot
JSY beneficiary                                                                                                                                                                                  
    Actual                                                      33.7                                                                        4.4                                                56.1                                                                      55.2
    After deducting incentive                   25.6                                                                        3.5                                                40.8                                                                      40.8
    Difference                                               8.1                                                                         0.9                                                15.3                                                                      14.4
    Non JSY                                                   78.6                                                                       29.2                                               83.8                                                                     215.1
JSY beneficiary (n): 223, non JSY (n): 173, JSY beneficiary without reimbursement i.e. cash incentive of JSY was not deducted; HC:  catastrophic head count, Non-food expenditure: capacity to pay.
holds but the gap in the adjusted percentages for catastrophic head-
counts at non-food expenditure threshold narrowed down. 
Table 5 also presents the odds of suffering from catastrophic
expenditure. Religion, caste, and parity of women did not turn out
to be statistically significant predictors of incurring catastrophic
expenditure. The likelihood of incurring catastrophic expenditure
at 10% of income threshold was higher in women with primary to
secondary-level of education compared to illiterate and less than
primary educated women while the odds at 40% of non-food
expenditure were higher among women with primary-level educa-
tion. Not working women were significantly less likely to suffer
from catastrophic maternity expenditure compared to working
women. The odds were higher for those women whose husbands
worked in agriculture compared to the women whose husbands
were in casual labour. The likelihood of incurring catastrophic
expenditure among richer women was much lower than poorer
women. It also comes to the fore that women who did not receive
the JSY incentive were several times more likely to incur catas-
trophic expenditure both at 10% of income and 40% of capacity-
to-pay thresholds. 
Discussion
The present study estimates all direct (formal and informal
medical expenditure) and indirect expenditure incurred by house-
holds due to maternity and examines the extent to which the JSY
incentives reduced the burden of cost incurred. The findings of the
study suggest that the JSY beneficiaries incur a substantial amount
of direct out-of-pocket expenditure on maternity care even though
the publicly-funded health system is supposed to provide its ser-
vices free of cost. It turns out that close to one-fourth of total out-
of-pocket expenditure on maternity care by the JSY beneficiaries
comes from direct expenditures which ideally should not incur as
the public health system is supposed to provide maternity services
free of cost. 
This direct out-of-pocket medical expenditure may have
incurred due to several reasons. Previous studies have found that
the low availability of essential medicines at public health facilities
and corrupt practices prevalent among doctors and pharmacists
force patients to purchase medicines from private pharmacies
where there is higher availability of medicines and for many
medicines, only one brand of the product is available usually the
costly one. This leaves patients with no choice but to buy that cost-
ly branded product thereby incurring catastrophic drug expendi-
ture.31 The user charges and informal payments (bribes) to the
providers and other health workers are also added to the expenses. 
Kickbacks and bribery in India’s public health facilities are a
common phenomenon.32 Kickbacks are illegal in India, but they
are nearly impossible to avoid in public health facilities, especially
for the poor and illiterate. Patients incurr a lot of informal pay-
ments during various stages of maternity in lieu of services
received from the health facility. Moreover, the public health sys-
tem is generally perceived to be incompetent to treat emergency
obstetric complications and the patients prefer to visit the private
providers for the treatment. Also the women who undergo C-sec-
tion in the district hospital have to bear additional treatment costs.
It is also a fact that most women are unaware of the benefits they
are entitled to receive under the JSY for C-section delivery in
accredited private hospitals. An important finding of the present
study is that the indirect or non-medical expenditure forms a major
chunk of the out-of-pocket payments made towards maternity. A
deeper look into the data collected from the field reveals that moth-
ers often have to pay for transportation from their own pocket.
Although the state has a 24×7 free ambulance services, the fact of
the matter is it is not always available, at least in Varanasi district,
forcing patients to use unregistered private vehicles. 
Another major source of the indirect expenditure is the loss of
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mother's wages during maternity period. It is a well-established
fact that poor women continue to work to earn a living for the fam-
ily right up to the last days of their pregnancy, thus not being able
to put on as much weight as they otherwise might. They also
resume working soon after childbirth, even though their bodies
might not permit it preventing their bodies from fully recovering,
and their ability to exclusively breastfeed their new born in the first
six months. Therefore, there is urgent need to introduce a modest
maternity benefit in the JSY to partly compensate for their wage
loss. Although, the Government of India has announced a new
scheme entitled Indira Gandhi Matritva Sahyog Yojana for preg-
nant and lactating women that provides Rs.6000 as partial wage
compensation to pregnant and lactating women in order to promote
rest and healthy feeding practices, as well as increase utilisation of
healthcare services, how successful it would be is yet to be seen.
The analysis showed that the maternal health expenditure even
in the public sector was regressive. In other words, the poor
women a relatively higher proportion of their disposable income
compared to the rich women to avail maternity services from pub-
licly-funded health facilities. Even in absolute terms, the expendi-
ture of poorer JSY households on maternity care exceeded that of
richer households by about Rs.2000. It is argued that that due to
low social capital, the poor people are often forced to make a lot of
informal payments in public health facilities to receive services,
while the rich pay no extra or informal fees and enjoy the service
free of charge. 
One important question that this paper asked at the outset was
that to what extent the JSY protects households from incurring
catastrophic expenditure. The analysis revealed that the monetary
incentive of the JSY helped only about 8.1% (33.7% without JSY
benefit and 25.6% with JSY) households at 10% of consumption
expenditure threshold and 15.3% households (56.1% without JSY
benefit and 40.8% with JSY) at capacity to pay threshold to escape
from suffering catastrophic burden. It suggests that the JSY has
achieved only a limited success in reducing th economic burden of
out-of-pocket expenditure on maternal health care. 
                                Article
Table 5. Expenditure on maternity, catastrophic headcounts, odds ratios by background characteristics of women, Rural Varanasi, 2013-
14 (n=396).
Background Mean TMHCE         At 10% of annual consumption expenditure;       At 40% of annual consumption expenditure;
characteristics                                JSY       Non JSY % catastrophic expenditure % catastrophic  expenditure
                                                                                                   Unadjusted      Adjusted°       OR                       Unadjusted     Adjusted°            OR
Religion                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
    Hindu#                                                         4825             24668                                50.9                        51.2               1.000                                     61.6                      40.8                     1.000
    Muslim                                                       3555             17202                                38.2                        34.6               0.579                                     50.0                      36.2                     0.699
Caste                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
    Other#                                                         5787             21851                                44.4                        37.8               1.000                                     48.9                      23.3                     1.000
    OBC                                                             4486             24501                                48.8                        23.4               1.165                                     60.5                      43.7                     1.813
    SC                                                                3473             20801                                51.4                        21.4               1.818                                     62.9                      59.0                     1.177
Age of mother (in years)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
    15-24#                                                          4390             24375                                49.8                        23.1               1.000                                     59.3                      40.3                     1.000
    25 and above                                             4810             22615                                47.4                        28.4               0.864                                     60.0                      41.4                     1.036
Parity                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
    1                                                                   4536             21779                                51.4                        45.0               0.928                                     59.5                      54.9                     0.483
    2 to 3#                                                          4432             20709                                46.5                        25.4               1.000                                     58.8                      35.9                     1.000
    4 to 7                                                           5718             28540                                54.8                        22.9               1.284                                     61.3                      36.3                     1.253
Education of woman                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
    Illiterate or below primary school#     4826             25775                                45.4                        31.5               1.000                                     64.4                      54.7                     1.000
    High school                                               4322             22494                                57.1                        22.2               1.153                                     59.5                      12.2                   0.467**
    Above high school                                    4225             25775                                48.3                        15.9               1.418                                     51.7                      23.5                    0.559*
Work status of woman                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
    Working#                                                     6665             25775                                66.7                        48.7               1.000                                     77.5                      62.6                     1.000
    Non-working                                              3450             22494                                39.1                        13.1            0.209***                                 50.0                      12.7                 0.221***
Occupation of husband                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
    Casual Labour#                                         6659             20658                                54.9                        37.5               1.000                                     68.0                      45.2                     1.000
    Agriculture                                                 5397             23035                                64.9                        47.4             1.115**                                   70.3                      51.2                     0.789
    Business                                                    4132             23676                                40.8                        18.3               0.753                                     51.5                      46.3                     0.676
    Regular salary                                           2893             26215                                41.7                         7.1              0.486**                                   51.5                      31.6                    0.528*
Expenditure quintiles                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
    Poorest#                                                  5135            18626                              62.8                      41.5              1.000                                   76.9                    53.2                   1.000
    Poor                                                         5056            23401                              57.5                      31.7              0.518                                   65.0                    25.2                 0.622**
    Middle                                                     4380            27594                               45                        25.5             0.487*                                  56.3                    35.0                  0.449*
    Rich                                                         3803            26201                              46.3                      16.3            0.412**                                56.3                    29.6                   0.461
    Richest                                                    3980            22153                              32.1                      14.9           0.137***                               43.6                    39.9                0.211***
JSY benefit received                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
    Yes#                                                             -                    -                                  25.6                      24.6              1.000                                   40.8                    41.2                   1.000
    No                                                                -                    -                                  78.6                      79.6           18.53***                               83.8                    83.5                13.37***
One US$ was approximately equal to Rs60 in 2014. For JSY beneficiaries, the expenditures were obtained after deducting incentive: JSY incentive amount (Rs.1400) from the total maternal health care expenditure. OR,
odds ratio; °adjusted in a manner similar to a Multiple Classification Analysis, from the predicted values obtained from the logit regression, holding all other explanatory variables at average (that is, population distri-
bution). #Reference category. ***P≤0.001; **P≤0.05; *P≤0.01.
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The study also examined the determinants of catastrophic
expenditure on maternity. In this regard, the finding that the richer,
educated, and regularly salaried women were less likely to incur
catastrophic maternity expenditure is similar to the findings of pre-
vious studies conducted in India and elsewhere.9,12 It is argued that
richer and educated women are often more aware about the func-
tioning of the health system and government health schemes
through their greater exposure to the mass media, and know their
healthcare rights as a mother which helps them avoid making any
informal payment to avail services in public health facilities. The
findings revealed that the non-JSY women were several times
more likely to experience catastrophic maternal expenditure com-
pared to the JSY beneficiaries. It should sound an alarm bell for the
government as this finding suggests exorbitant costs of maternity
care prevailing in the private healthcare sector. 
Limitations
The most apparent limitation of the study might be in collect-
ing the household consumption expenditure. The study followed
the methodology for calculating the same as guided by the
National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO). NSSO used an
extensive survey tool to collect the household consumption expen-
diture for the rounds of consumption expenditure survey which
was practically not time and cost effective for an individual
researcher, besides the prime motive of the survey was to collect
the expenditure incurred on maternity extensively. Next, the sur-
vey relied on the reporting of expenditure by the respondents
which was further cross checked by the reporting of elder member
(s) of the households (who were mostly present during interviews).
This was the method also applied by the NSSO in India, still one
may not deny under or over reporting of expenditure by the respon-
dents and hence could be regarded as a limitation of this study. 
Conclusions
This study reveals that JSY beneficiaries are spending a sub-
stantial amount on the services that are supposed to be provided
free-of-cost in public health facilities. This is a loophole in the
implementation of the JSY scheme that needs to be plugged
urgently to stop spillage of the JSY money. Moreover, the amount
of JSY incentive should be revised taking into consideration the
rise in inflation since the year 2005 when the incentive was first
fixed. As women incurred a significant amount of expenditure dur-
ing antenatal and postnatal care as well, the JSY incentive should
be linked to prenatal and postnatal care to encourage the use of full
continuum of maternity services available at public health facilities
which in turn could help reduce maternity related complications
and thereby expenditure as well. A significant portion of out-of-
expenditure was due to wage loss and it should be incorporated in
the JSY benefit. The findings that even the JSY beneficiaries incur
a huge indirect expenditure on maternity and the exiting JSY
incentive can save only a limited number of households from
incurring catastrophic expenditure suggests there is an urgent need
to review this demand-side financing scheme.  
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